Law as Science: Revisiting Langdell\u27s Paradigm in the 21st Century by Cook, Nancy
North Dakota Law Review 
Volume 88 Number 1 Article 2 
1-1-2012 
Law as Science: Revisiting Langdell's Paradigm in the 21st 
Century 
Nancy Cook 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Cook, Nancy (2012) "Law as Science: Revisiting Langdell's Paradigm in the 21st Century," North Dakota 
Law Review: Vol. 88 : No. 1 , Article 2. 
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol88/iss1/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. For 
more information, please contact zeineb.yousif@library.und.edu. 
         
 
LAW AS SCIENCE: 
REVISITING LANGDELL’S PARADIGM IN 




This Article examines the idea that law is science, a notion that was 
long ago introduced into the law school curriculum in the guise of the 
“casebook method” and Socratic teaching by Dean Christopher Columbus 
Langdell at Harvard Law School.  This Article posits that radical shifts in 
the philosophy of science merit a return to the idea of law as science, even 
as law schools flounder in search of a pedagogical ideology that is 
consistent with modern law practice.  Two scientific philosophers, in 
particular, are the focus:  Karl Popper, whose work repudiated the 
longstanding observationalist-inductivist account of scientific method; and 
Thomas Kuhn, whose seminal book, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC 
REVOLUTIONS, describes the work of scientists as operating with a series of 
paradigms.  Derivative theories demonstrating the efficacy of scientific 
methods that elevate the significance of invention and creative 
reconceptualization have application to law in a time of rapid technological 
innovation and globalization. 
  
 
* Vaughan G. Papke Professor of Clinical Law, University of Minnesota School of Law.  I 
had the opportunity to workshop a version of this piece at the NYU and Clinical Law Review 
Writers Workshop.  Thanks especially to Gemma Smyth, Bob Seibel, Karen Tokarz, Michael 
Pinard, David Koelsch, and Margaret Barry for comments. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This short Article revisits an old notion:  the idea that law is science.  
In addressing this topic, this Article briefly examines the origins of the idea 
of law as science in the context of the late nineteenth century when 
Christopher Columbus Langdell first introduced the concept at Harvard 
Law School.  As a general matter, science is “[t]he observation, 
identification, description, experimental investigation, and theoretical 
explanation of phenomena,” or a methodological approach to knowledge 
acquisition.1  The science paradigm advocated by Langdell was rooted in 
the accepted wisdom of the time that the work of science was to uncover – 
to discover – immutable laws of nature.2  More than a century later, even 
after considerable and persistent critiques of the methods adopted to lead 
law students “scientifically” to the “discovery” of law’s basic principles, 
legal academics continue to follow the Langdellian approach to law and 
legal education, if for reasons other than those expressed by Langdell 
 
1. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1560 (4th ed. 
2006). 
2. Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 17 (1983). 
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himself.3  In light of this history, both the persistence of Langdell-inspired 
teaching methods and the persistent critiques of the same, this Article posits 
that law may indeed be like science, although not science as it was 
generally understood in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  
Rather, law may be understood to be, as a growing number of scientific 
philosophers maintain, a process of invention or creative 
reconceptualization.  Accordingly, viewed from a modern perspective, 
science may well be a still useful – and needed – paradigm for today’s 
lawyers and legal educators. 
In Langdell’s time, one of the attractions of science as an analogy to 
law was its purported certainty and predictability.  In science, as in law, 
however, these characteristics have been demonstrated to be no more than 
wishful thinking.  Yet science still has its attractions.  Traditional scientific 
methods are useful as a means of testing knowledge and creating 
opportunities for the expansion of knowledge through a process of 
perception or discovery.4  Additionally, science – the science of Bacon5 and 
Newton,6 and even Aristotle7 – is the foundation of technology or invention, 
and invention is transformative in daily human life, a value that is hard to 
overstate.  The critical rationalists,8 who followed Karl Popper,9 and the 
science studies sociologists, adherents to Thomas Kuhn’s philosophy,10 
have offered theories allowing for the tentative acceptance, deconstruction, 
and reconstruction of conceptual paradigms.11  The new science recognizes 
the benefits of received beliefs, designated as principles or rules, but is also 
keenly aware of the limitations of those beliefs.  Today, the scientific 
method is understood to consist of more than the piling of newly discovered 
“truths” onto existing ones through discovery, testing, hypothesizing, and 
retesting; it involves an active reconceptualization of what is true and the 
generation of whole new conceptual paradigms. 
 
3. While not often legitimated by reference to Langdell principles, law schools still largely 
adhere to the methodology.  See WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS:  
PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW 2-3, 5 (2007) (noting, inter alia, that Langdellian 
case-dialogue method, which “socializes” law students very quickly and inculcates an ability to 
“think like a lawyer,” remains the predominant teaching mode for American law schools as of the 
time of the writing of the report). 
4. See infra pp. 25-27. 
5. See infra pp. 26-27. 
6. See infra pp. 27-29. 
7. See infra pp. 25-27. 
8. See infra p. 38. 
9. See infra pp. 38-41. 
10. See infra pp. 39-42. 
11. See infra pp. 41-42. 
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In approaching law in this way, this Article does not intend to spark 
debates about the relative values of Langdell’s science paradigm so much as 
to point out the void that has been left by the nearly complete erosion of the 
original paradigm, and to postulate that it might be filled by a fully updated 
science paradigm.  Although some have displayed a surprisingly fierce 
loyalty to the underlying theories on which the Langdell approach to 
“thinking like a lawyer” was based, it can hardly be denied that scientific 
theory has come a long way since Langdell hitched Harvard Law School’s 
star to “the scientific method.”12  But it also bears noting that, as a general 
matter, one great strength of science is that it is self-correcting.  The nature 
of scientific inquiry demands that scientists abandon theories when they are 
shown to be irrational or unsupportable.  The scientific method is not an 
inalterable recipe; it requires intellect, imagination, and creativity.  In recent 
times, in fact, it has been emphasized that science is an ongoing cycle, 
constantly developing more useful, accurate and comprehensive models and 
methods.13  If law is viewed this way, the Langdell notion that its core 
principles can be “discovered” loses efficacy.  At the same time, however, 
in keeping with modern characterizations of science, law could be viewed 
as an ongoing dynamic, dependent on past models, developments, and 
understandings.  The legal academy, in keeping with this evolved 
perspective, could preserve the “law as science” paradigm by expanding 
pedagogical methods in the first year to include a focus on understanding 
law as a creative and inventive process that is distinctly different from – or 
certainly more complex than – a process of discovery. 
The Article is broken down into five Parts.  Following this brief 
introduction in Part I, Part II, The Old Paradigm, provides the historical 
background and context for understanding the proposed paradigmatic shift.  
Part III, An Imperfect Evolution, explores the continuing utilization of the 
original scientific method paradigm, as well as the changing forms and 
rationalizations that have accompanied its use.  In Part IV, The New 
Scientific Paradigm, twentieth century developments in science are used to 
revisit the Langdellian premise and redefine the parameters of a scientific-
 
12. See infra pp. 24-26; 29-32. 
13. This can be understood by a simple example:  When Einstein developed his SPECIAL 
AND GENERAL THEORIES OF RELATIVITY, he did not wholly discount Newton’s PRINCIPIA 
(PHILOSOPHIAE NATURALIS PRINCIPIA MATHEMATICA 1687).  In fact, if phenomena that Newton 
could not have observed, given the technological constraints of the time, are removed from 
Einstein’s theories, Newton’s equations remain.  Einstein’s theories are expansions and 
refinements of Newton’s theories based on increased data and shifts in perspective.  They validate, 
rather than undermine, Newton’s accomplishments.  See Stephen W. Hawking, Newton’s 
Principia, in THREE HUNDRED YEARS OF GRAVITATION 1, 4 (Stephen W. Hawking & Werner 
Israel eds., 1989). 
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method analogy for law school pedagogy.  Finally, Part V consists of 
applications of the revised paradigm in the context of doctrinal law courses.  
Using the legal principles and paradigms relating to defenses to negligence, 
the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, and statutory 
construction of sexual harassment, the applicability of scientific method is 
demonstrated.  The Article notes in conclusion that the science paradigm of 
the twenty-first century provides a shift in perspective that allows for a 
reordering of knowledge, one which is not only more inclusive of multiple 
existing realities, but opens the gates for creativity and new understandings 
of law in context and in operation. 
II. THE OLD PARADIGM 
At Harvard Law School in the late nineteenth century, Langdell sought 
to modernize professional education by incorporating the best known 
scientific methods into the classroom laboratory.  His basic pedagogical 
approach to the teaching of contracts, generally referred to as “Socratic 
method,” is still widely in use in American law schools. 
A. SCIENCE AS A CHOSEN CONCEPTUAL FRAME OF THE LATE 
 NINETEENTH CENTURY 
Since the years of Langdell’s reign at Harvard,14 the first-year 
curriculum of the vast majority of the nation’s law schools has been 
primarily about the teaching of doctrine and, more specifically, common 
law doctrine.15  The origins of this agenda, the Harvard method, came about 
in the latter half of the nineteenth century, when science was the rage in 
intellectual circles, and law, as a profession and an academic discipline, was 
anxious to be admitted to the university academy.16  Then, as today, people 
wanted law to be predictable and neutral.17  Professionals were loathe to 
admit to uncertainty about the principles governing judicial decision-
making and sought a conceptual frame that would both bring order to chaos 
and render the teaching of the subject rigorous enough to merit university 
admission.  Science provided that conceptual framework.18  In this 
 
14. Langdell served as dean from 1870 to 1895.  BRUCE A. KIMBALL, THE INCEPTION OF 
MODERN PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION:  C.C. LANGDELL, 1826–1906, at 2 (Daniel Ernst & Thomas 
A. Green eds., 2009).  His teaching career spanned another five years.  Id. at 8. 
15. Edward Rubin, What’s Wrong with Langdell’s Method, and What to Do About it, 60 
VAND. L. REV. 609, 649 (2007). 
16. See KIMBALL, supra note 14, at 345. 
17. See Grey, supra note 2, at 45. 
18. See id. at 17. 
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environment, a relative upstart at Harvard Law School, Langdell, 
introduced the notion that law is science and should be taught as such.19 
In the late nineteenth century, the scientific system of acquiring 
knowledge was viewed as completely objective, rational, and empirical. 
Scientific theories and laws were believed to be conclusively confirmed or 
conclusively falsified on the basis of objective data.20  This provided the 
kind of certainty that many craved, especially in the wake of an 
Enlightenment that had exposed as irrational many belief systems anchored 
in irrefutable religious or mythological tenets.21 
Certainty could be achieved through “the scientific method,” which had 
roots in classical philosophy.  One of Aristotle‘s contentions was that 
universal truths can be known from observation of particular things; he 
thereby provided one of the primary ingredients of scientific tradition:  
empiricism.  Aristotle used induction as a way of reconciling abstract 
thought with observation.22  Although he did not claim that knowledge 
acquired by induction constitutes scientific knowledge, he saw induction as 
a necessary prelude to scientific inquiry, in that measured and detailed 
observations could provide the premises required to engage in scientific 
experimentation.23  Induction became the foundation of modern science, 
later advocated and popularized by Francis Bacon.24 
Baconian inductivism was the apex of scientific method in the early 
seventeenth century.25  The basic technique was the collection of copious 
observations, theoretically uninfluenced by any prior prejudice or 
intellectual preconceptions, followed by an inductive discovery of 
operational laws or theories gained by generalizing from the data.26  But the 
weaknesses of induction as an overarching approach to science were soon 
exposed.  The method is problematical not least because one initial 
condition – freedom from theoretical preconceptions – is an impossibility.27  
 
19. Id. at 5. 
20. See id. at 17. 
21. Rubin, supra note 15, at 624. 
22. Christof Rapp, The Nature and Goals of Rhetoric, in A COMPANION TO ARISTOTLE 579, 
580 (Georgios Anagnostopoulos ed., 2009). 
23. Aristotle attributes the idea of induction to Socrates.  ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS, bk. 
VIII, at 220 (John H. McMahon trans., George Bell & Sons 1904). 
24. KARL POPPER, THE MYTH OF THE FRAMEWORK:  IN DEFENCE OF SCIENCE AND 
RATIONALITY 84 (M.A. Notturno ed., 1994) [hereinafter POPPER, MYTH OF THE FRAMEWORK]. 
25. Grey, supra note 2, at 12-13; Rubin, supra note 15, at 632-33. 
26. Francis Bacon, Thoughts and Conclusions on the Interpretation of Nature or a Science 
Productive of Works, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF FRANCIS BACON 73, 89 (Benjamin Farrington trans., 
Liverpool Univ. Press 1964) (1653). 
27. See COLIN HOWSON, HUME’S PROBLEM:  INDUCTION AND THE JUSTIFICATION OF 
BELIEF 10-11 (2000); KARL POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 7-10 (Routledge 
Classics 2002) (1935) [hereinafter POPPER, LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY]. 
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In fact, when using inductivism to arrive at natural laws, certain theoretical 
preconceptions are vital.  To generalize from the data, the individual must 
assume uniform operation of nature, that is, that the laws apply equally to 
physical processes not observed.28 
An answer to this dilemma was found in another form of Aristotelian 
logic:  deductive reasoning.29  Using syllogisms, scientists could infer new 
universal truths from those already established.  Deductive reasoning was 
particularly suitable in a world in which change, or evolution, was deemed 
to be part of the nature of things.  The deductive method imposed 
continuing responsibilities on scientists to collect increasingly more data to 
measure the consistency of the applicability of existing known laws.  This 
process, with its heavy reliance on empirical observation, was followed by 
modification or rejection of existing laws as necessitated by conflicting 
comparative results.30 
But this approach had limited utility as well.  One problem is that not 
all data is sensory.  Science deals with objects that cannot be directly 
observed, such as subatomic particles and the force of gravity.  Even the 
application of mathematics to natural phenomena was severely limited by 
this method, since most of nature (i.e., the empirical world) is in a constant 
state of nonlinear change, and the mathematics of the time was only able to 
deal with phenomena that remained more or less static.  With the invention 
of calculus, generally attributed to Isaac Newton and Gottfried Wilhelm 
Leibnez, mathematics was able to describe change.31  Where previously, 
mathematics – geometry and early number theory, in particular – were, 
through inductivism, identified as part of the ideal, unchanging world, 
empiricism became the method of choice to learn about the ever-changing 
environment. 
Newtonian theory, eventually termed hypothetico-deductivism, was the 
paradigm shift needed to make mathematics applicable to both the static 
and dynamic aspects of the empirical world.32  The process is basically one 
in which human irrationality is quarantined: the beginning point, or 
hypothesis, is followed by deductive predictions, which can then be tested, 
through repeated experimentation, against empirical data.  The sources of 
theory are irrelevant in hypothetico-deductivism since, regardless of origin, 
 
28. See HOWSON, supra note 27, at 10-11. 
29. Rapp, supra note 22, at 580. 
30. See POPPER, LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY, supra note 27, at 17-20. 
31. STEVEN JOHNSON, WHERE GOOD IDEAS COME FROM:  THE NATURAL HISTORY OF 
INNOVATION 261 (2010). 
32. Peter Achinstein, Introduction:  Hypotheti-Deductivism, the Mill-Whewell Debate and 
the Wave Theory of Light, in SCIENCE RULES 127, 127 (Peter Achinstein ed., 2004). 
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theories can be tested against empirical findings and confirmed or refuted.  
A theory is validated not by reference to its historical source, but within a 
defined, temporal universe, through a laborious method of verification. 
Newton’s work became a model that other sciences sought to emulate, 
and his approach was foundational to much of natural philosophy 
throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.33  The basic 
method used for scientific inquiry, still in general application today,34 
consists of a methodological paradigm combining these concepts:  
operations, observations, models, and a utility function for evaluating 
models.  “Operations” in this context implies that some action is being done 
to the system being investigated; “observation” is activity undertaken as 
and after the operation is done to the system.35  A model may be a 
hypothesis, theory, or the phenomenon under study; utility function is the 
means by which the usefulness of the model is measured.36  The method has 
been broken down into operational components, generally consisting of: 
1. Defining the question; 
2. Gathering data (observing, measuring); 
3. Forming a hypothesis; 
4. Experimenting and recording observed data; 
5. Analyzing data; 
6. Interpreting data and drawing conclusions that serve as a starting 
  point for a new hypothesis; 
7. Publishing results; and 
8. Retesting.37 
 
33. Some of his methods were later systematized by John Stuart Mill.  Among the efforts 
made to classify fields of study outside physical sciences as science were those by WILLIAM 
STANLEY JEVONS in his THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENCE:  A TREATISE ON LOGIC AND SCIENTIFIC 
METHOD (1887).  Jevons argued for the centrality of the hypothetico-deductive method in the 
logic of science and framed the methodology in terms of probability, which he then applied to 
economic laws.  Similarly, the idea that law was, like any physical science, a coherent system 
built on fixed principles, was the standard view of the time.  See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Taking 
Law and ____ Really Seriously:  Before, During and after “The Law,” 60 VAND. L. REV. 555, 
556-67 (2007). 
34. Although these methodological elements and this organization of procedures tend to be 
more characteristic of natural sciences than social sciences, the cycle of formulating hypotheses, 
testing and analyzing the results, and formulating new hypotheses in social science research fields 
resembles the cycle described. 
35. See generally RICHARD P. FEYNMAN ET AL., SIX EASY PIECES:  ESSENTIALS OF PHYSICS 
EXPLAINED BY ITS MOST BRILLIANT TEACHER 24 (1965); JEVONS, supra note 33, at 265-66. 
36. See generally PETER GEOFFREY-SMITH, THEORY AND REALITY:  AN INTRODUCTION TO 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 6-17 (2003); LUDWICK FLECK, GENESIS AND DEVELOPMENT OF A 
SCIENTIFIC FACT 66-71 (Thaddeus J. Trenn ed., 1981). 
37. There are many ways the components of scientific methods have been described.  While 
the language varies somewhat and the specific characterization of the actions may differ, in 
general these eight steps capture the range of these descriptions.  See infra notes 44, 45, 135, & 
137 (containing different variations on which this list is based). 
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All of these ideas influenced Langdell’s thinking.38  In accordance with 
his understanding that law is a scientific discipline and his belief that it 
should be treated as such in the university setting, Langdell introduced into 
the United States in the late nineteenth century a model of legal education 
that survives, and even thrives, today.39 
B. CONFLATION OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD WITH CASE 
 BOOK/SOCRATIC METHOD 
Langdell’s oft-quoted theory of law as science is succinctly laid out in 
his Contracts text book: 
Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or 
doctrines.  To have such mastery of these as to be able to apply 
them with constant facility and certainty to the ever-tangled skein 
of human affairs, is what constitutes a true lawyer . . . .  [T]he 
number of fundamental legal doctrines is much less than is 
commonly supposed; the many different guises in which the same 
doctrine is constantly making its appearance, and the great extent 
to which legal treatises are a repetition of each other, being the 
cause of much misapprehension.  If these doctrines could be so 
classified and arranged that each should be found in its proper 
place, and nowhere else, they would cease to be formidable in their 
number.40 
The basic principles underlying Langdell’s pedagogy have been simply 
stated: 
1. Law involves a scientific analysis able to reveal the life-giving 
principles of the common law. 
2. This science of law could be advanced only by specially trained 
researchers – not practitioners – who were committed to 
disciplined analysis. 
3. The subject most appropriate for such scientific analysis is the 
body of written appellate opinions. 
 
38. To the extent that science served as the paradigm for Langdell’s pedagogy, it would have 
to be said that it consisted of an oleo of scientific philosophies then extant.  See KIMBALL, supra 
note 14, app. II, at 349-51 (making the point that Langdell’s purported reliance on natural science 
in devising his teaching methods has been overstated). 
39. Rubin, supra note 15, at 610-11; WILLIAM C. CHASE, THE AMERICAN LAW SCHOOL 
AND THE RISE OF ADMINISTRATIVE GOVERNMENT 27-31 (1982). 
40. C.C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, at viii-ix (2d ed. 
1879). 
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4. Legal education means instilling techniques for scientific 
probing into these opinions. 
5. Like other sciences, law should be pursued under circumstances 
most conducive to scientific thought, viz., in a university rather 
than in the hurly-burly world of law offices and courts where law 
is learned, at best, unscientifically.41 
These principles have been thoroughly explained and analyzed;42 thus, 
a brief overview will suffice here.  With regard to the initial premise, Carrie 
Menkel-Meadow points out that Langdell was noted for “[t]reating law (as 
a field) as a science of principles learned by induction through reading cases 
and systematically arranging their holdings into a coherent body of limited, 
general principles.”43  He publicly asserted that “the approach to law 
embodied in the Harvard curriculum was a form of natural science;” in fact, 
he maintained that this approach was natural science itself.44  Classroom 
exploration was, essentially, a search for the already known.  Langdell 
believed that by examining cases, students “would come to perceive the 
enduring principles of Anglo-American law that lay behind them.”45 
Similarly, Thomas Grey describes Langdell’s vision as one in which 
“[t]he legal system was to be so arranged that it resolved hard disputes by 
indubitable (even if complex) reasoning . . . .  The system would be 
predictable; people could know in which circumstances they would get the 
aid and in which they would face the opposition of state power.”46  Legal 
principles were to be discerned by inductive reasoning, and empirical 
evidence was to be found in judicial decisions that had been published in 
 
41. Nancy L. Schultz, How Do Lawyers Really Think?, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 57, 58 (1992); 
see also Rudolph J. Gerber, Legal Education and Combat Preparedness, 34 AM. J. JURIS. 61, 67 
(1989). 
42. See generally James Barr Ames, Christopher Columbus Langdell, 1826-1906, in 8 
GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS 465, 483-85 (William D. Lewis ed., 1909); HARV. LAW SCH. 
ASS’N, THE CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, 1817–1917 (1918); 
MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960:  THE CRISIS OF 
LEGAL ORTHODOXY (1992); KIMBALL, supra note 14; ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL:  LEGAL 
EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S (1987); CHARLES WARREN, HISTORY 
OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL AND OF EARLY LEGAL CONDITIONS IN AMERICA, vol. 2 (1908). 
43. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 33, at 561. 
44. Rubin, supra note 15, at 632. 
45. Id. at 634.  Rubin contends that Langdell was influenced by Louis Agassiz.  Agassiz 
insisted the biological world was composed of fixed, unchanging forms that had been specially 
created, and he believed that empirical examination of particular plants and animals would reveal 
the essential features of those forms.  Id. 
46. Grey, supra note 2, at 32.  In Grey’s analysis, “[t]he core notion of classical legal science 
can be grasped through the analogy to geometry, as that subject was understood in the late 
nineteenth century.”  Id. at 16; see also OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 35 
(1881) (“The official theory is that a new decision follows syllogistically from existing 
precedents.”). 
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court reporters.47  The Socratic method was the means by which “scientific” 
principles or principles of knowledge would be “discovered” by students.48 
What was radical about Langdell’s ideas was not the notion that law is 
science, but the attendant proposal to overhaul legal education to adapt to 
scientific inquiry.  What Langdell and Harvard President Charles William 
Eliot added was the application of scientific discovery to legal education, 
that is, the idea that Socratic inquiry would disclose the principles that were 
the source of law’s coherence.49  In a relatively short period of time, those 
charged with educating students in the law “cast out the textbooks, and [in 
their place] used . . . cases, carefully selected and arranged to illustrate the 
meaning and development of principles of law.”50 
This case book method became the “single most prominent feature of 
twentieth-century American legal education.”51  The methodology has been 
noted to incorporate dual strands:  “first, the study of law through the 
medium of judicial opinions, mainly appellate opinions, that have been 
rendered in actual disputes; and second, the examination of these opinions 
in a spirit that has often, and aptly, been described as ‘Socratic.’”52  The 
change in textbooks was accompanied by a change in the role of law 
faculty.53  A professor could no longer stand at the podium and lecture; he 
was, instead, “a Socratic guide, leading the student to an understanding of 
concepts and principles hidden as essences among the cases.”54 
The expertise necessary to conduct in-class discovery of essential 
principles was to be found not in practicing lawyers, but in legal academics, 
the equivalent of researchers in the scientific community.55  Langdell and 
his champion, Harvard President Eliot, were strongly influenced by the 
German University system, which employed structured, directed 
 
47. Rubin, supra note 15, at 632-33; see Menkel-Meadow, supra note 33, at 561. 
48. Rubin, supra note 15, at 611-12. 
49. Id. at 611. 
50. David D. Garner, Socratic Misogyny? — Analyzing Feminist Criticisms of Socratic 
Teaching in Legal Education, 2000 BYU L. REV. 1597, 1604 (quoting LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, 
A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 531 (1973)).  “Within fifty years of its introduction, the case 
method and the accompanying Socratic method were firmly entrenched as the backbone of legal 
education.”  Id.  “By the 1920s, anybody who was anybody in the law school ‘industry’ used the 
case method,” presumably in tandem with the Socratic dialogue.  Id. (quoting ROBERT STEVENS, 
LAW SCHOOL:  LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S 123 (1983)). 
51. Anthony Kronman, The Socratic Method and the Development of the Moral Imagination, 
31 U. TOL. L. REV. 647, 647 (2000). 
52. Id. 
53. See Garner, supra note 50, at 1604; WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE LOST WORLD OF 
CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT:  LAW AND IDEOLOGY IN AMERICA 1886–1937, at 94-95 (1998). 
54. Garner, supra note 50, at 1604 (quoting LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF 
AMERICAN LAW 531(1973)). 
55. See Richard J. Wilson, Western Europe:  Last Holdout in the Worldwide Acceptance of 
Clinical Education, 10 GERMAN L. J. 823, 837 (2009); WIECEK, supra note 53, at 88-89, 94-95. 
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questioning by full-time academics and relied heavily on library research in 
legal analysis.56  According to Langdell, “the library is the proper workshop 
of professors and students alike; . . . it is to us all that the laboratories of the 
university are to the chemists and physicists, the museum of natural history 
to the zoologists, the botanical garden to the botanists.”57  Judicial 
decisions, published in court reporters, became the primary source of 
empirical evidence.58  Thus, the birth of the Socratic method was intimately 
intertwined with the replacement of textbooks by cases as the sole source of 
instructional material.  The origin of the term “Socratic method” has 
generally been attributed to Langdell in the law school context,59 who saw it 
as “a necessary adjunct to the case method of study.”60 
Although no historical record contains an explicit definition of the 
Socratic method as Langdell perceived it, his pedagogical methods in the 
classroom have been described: 
Langdell began his actual teaching by having each of the cases, 
which the students had to study carefully in preparation for the 
class, briefly analyzed by one of them with respect to the facts and 
the law contained in it.  He then added a series of questions, which 
were so arranged as gradually to lay bare the entire law contained 
in that particular case.  This stimulated questions, doubts, and 
objections on the part of individual students, against whom the 
teacher had to hold his ground in reply.  Teacher and pupils then, 
according to Langdell’s design, work together unremittingly to 
extract from the single cases and from the combination or 
contrasting of cases their entire legal content, so that in the end 
those principles of that particular branch of the law which control 
the entire mass of related cases are made clear.61 
This philosophy laid the foundation for law school pedagogy for the next 
century. 
 
56. See Wilson, supra note 55, at 837. 
57. KIMBALL, supra note 14, at 350 (quoting Langdell, Address 1886, reprinted in 9 L. Q. 
REV. 9, 49-50 (1887)). 
58. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 33, at 561; Rubin, supra note 15, at 632-33. 
59. Garner, supra note 50, at 1599 (footnote omitted). 
60. Alan A. Stone, Legal Education on the Couch, 85 HARV. L. REV. 392, 406 (1971). 
61. JOSEF REDLICH, THE COMMON LAW AND THE CASE METHOD IN AMERICAN 
UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL:  A REPORT TO THE CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT 
OF TEACHING 12 (2009). 
          
2012] LAW AS SCIENCE 33 
III. AN IMPERFECT EVOLUTION 
Although the twentieth century saw a great many changes in the 
conceptualization of scientific theory and method, the pedagogical shift 
Langdell inaugurated in its earliest years took root and held fast.  Changes 
in law school pedagogy advanced far more slowly than the justifications for 
retaining the case book method. 
A. CRITIQUES OF THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD PARADIGM 
Even as Langdell struggled to convince colleagues and students of the 
value of his pedagogy,62 the world of science was undergoing its own 
transformation.  Certainly inductive science, and to some extent, 
hypothetico-deductivism, were insufficient to explain the full range of 
scientific phenomena.  Even assuming the general reliability of sensory 
experience, memory, and testimony, the impossibility of examining all 
germane data was obvious.  Unrevealed data could always contradict the 
predictions of any known scientific law, and every theory was suspended in 
proof because of the infinite number of possible empirical outcomes.  A 
theory could be confirmed to some extent by empirical data, but it could 
never be conclusively confirmed. 
These and other critiques found their way into the field of “legal 
science.”  Case law is an ever-expanding field of data; thus, in law, as in 
science, new data would always threaten empirical outcomes and 
coincidentally the principles resting on them.  Specifically with respect to 
law, data derived from studying cases was admittedly distinguishable from 
sensory data obtained through observation.63  Yet Langdell made few 
concessions to progressive theories, including Darwinism,64 and with 
respect to applications to legal education, he remained steadfast in his 
adherence to earlier conceptions of science and scientific analysis.65  
Despite the fact that, almost since the inception of his methods, the 
scientific foundations were met with skepticism, Langdell’s case 
book/Socratic pedagogy spread unremittingly across the legal academic 
landscape during the first twenty years of the twentieth century.66 
 
62. Langdell’s ideas by no means received immediate acceptance.  See, e.g., JOEL 
SELIGMAN, THE HIGH CITADEL:  THE INFLUENCE OF HARVARD LAW SCHOOL 47 (1978); Robert 
Gordon, The Case for (and Against) Harvard, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1231, 1235 (1995) (book 
review).  Oliver Wendell Holmes was, at times, a particularly vocal critic.  William Epstein, The 
Classical Tradition of Dialectics and American Legal Education, 31 J. LEGAL EDUC. 399, 399-
400 (1981). 
63. Grey, supra note 2, at 20-21. 
64. Id. at 28-29; Rubin, supra note 15, at 634. 
65. Rubin, supra note 15, at 634. 
66. See id. at 612-13, 634. 
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Grey noted that “[o]n first encounter, the very idea of ‘legal science’ 
held by Langdell and his followers is baffling.”67  Others have described it 
as “an incomprehensible jumble of induction with deduction and of norm 
with fact,”68 and “[t]ranscendental nonsense.”69  It has been argued that its 
claims to empiricism and amoralism cannot be justified given the classroom 
discussions to which it leads lend themselves to both conceptual thinking 
and normative judgments.70  Even the notion that this pedagogy is Socratic 
has had numerous detractors.71  In a very short time, the scientific theory 
paradigm attributed to Langdell was “obsolete in entirety.”72 
Today the rhetoric seems to have softened.  Anthony Kronman sees in 
the Socratic method simply a healthy skepticism for all judicial 
pronouncements.73  Socratic questioning provides students with 
opportunities to draw distinctions and analogies, reconcile apparently 
inconsistent judgments, and make judgments about the soundness of legal 
reasoning.74  Such probing analysis places the burden on students to 
articulate what they understand the judicial authorities to be saying.75  From 
this perspective, the classroom is still viewed as a kind of scientific 
laboratory, in which professors convey knowledge and engage students in 
the “central activities of the natural or social scientist:  hypothesis, 
experimentation, and refinement of the hypothesis in response to test 
results.”76  It is a classroom scene that has survived, however, says Paul 
Carrington, “only because wiser men than Langdell, perceiving a moral 
subtext where he saw only the surface gloss of ‘legal science,’ had effected 
a separation of the method from its author’s madness, and so freed posterity 
 
67. Grey, supra note 2, at 16 (observing that one view of Langdell’s pedagogy is that of “a 
deductive natural law system based on self-evident moral axioms”). 
68. Id. 
69. See Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. 
L. REV. 809, 821 (1935). 
70. Grey, supra note 2, at 16 (“Langdell’s kind of theory . . . claims to be empirical and yet 
its practice is highly conceptual; it delivers normative judgments, yet proclaims the positivist 
autonomy of law from morals.”). 
71. “After all,” as Harvard law professor Phillip E. Areeda was wont to point out, “Socrates 
had never heard of Lawrence v. Fox; Palsgraf . . . .”  Phillip E. Areeda, The Socratic Method (Sm) 
(Lecture at Puget Sound, 1/31/90), 109 HARV. L. REV. 911, 911 (1996). 
72. Rubin, supra note 15, at 635. 
73. See Kronman, supra note 51, at 647. 
74. Areeda, supra note 71, at 915-16. 
75. Id. 
76. Philip M. Genty, Overcoming Cultural Blindness in International Clinical 
Collaboration:  The Divide Between Civil and Common Law Cultures and Its Implications for 
Clinical Education, 15 CLINICAL L. REV. 131, 152 (2008). 
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from ‘transcendental nonsense’ to teach the enduring morality of republican 
politics and law.”77 
B. SURVIVAL OF LANGDELL’S METHODS 
The critics have been persistent and frequently harsh; but Langdell’s 
paradigm has survived, and the methodologies he introduced have persisted, 
albeit in a modified form.  There are those who still see the method as akin 
to inductive natural science, designed to engender a “true understanding of 
first principles . . . . [and] ultimate good and truth.”78  Learning law is seen 
from this perspective solely in terms of discovery.  Others are less sanguine 
about the notion of first principles and see the method as refutational only, 
with any purported demonstration of truth or proof occurring as “an 
accidental byproduct.”79  The analogy to science is described as at least 
quasi-deductive, although still essentially a process of discovery:  
“understanding the problem, discerning the knowns and the unknowns, 
applying related theorems or principles, and conducting a trial-and-error 
process of experimentation.”80  The German system, from which Langdell 
borrowed, as well as other civil law systems, still approaches law as a set of 
fundamental norms which, by deduction, govern operative facts.81  Most 
agree, however, that the real lasting virtue of Langdell’s philosophy is to be 
found less in the premise of law as science and more in the methodology he 
adopted, a methodology that recalls earlier glory days of scientific 
rationalism and possesses other virtues that might call for its preservation. 
Despite the criticisms, the case method and the Socratic method have 
largely been seen not only as compatible with each other,82 but as having 
compatibility with scientific method, arising from the “essential duality and 
definitive ambiguities of the classic method.”83  This compatibility theory, 
with its associations to a scientific theory of discovery, seems to have stuck, 
in part perhaps because of a belief that the activity in the Socratic-like 
 
77. Christopher Tomlins, Bruce A. Kimball, the Inception of Modern Professional 
Education:  C.C. Langdell, 1826-1906, 59 J. LEGAL EDUC. 657, 658 (2010) (book review). 
78. Epstein, supra note 62, at 404. 
79. Harold Tarrant, Elenchos and Exetasis:  Capturing the Purpose of Socratic 
Interrogation, in DOES SOCRATES HAVE A METHOD?:  RETHINKING THE ELENCHUS IN PLATO’S 
DIALOGUES AND BEYOND 61, 63 (Gary Alan Scott ed., 2002). 
80. Robert J. Rhee, The Socratic Method and the Mathematical Heuristic of George Polya, 
81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 881, 887 (2007); see generally Donald G. Marshall, Socratic Method and 
Irreducible Core of Legal Education, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2005) (calling for the revival of the 
Socratic method, defined as allowing for student discovery of principles). 
81. Wilson, supra note 55, at 837. 
82. Id. 
83. Amy R. Mashburn, Can Xenophon Save the Socratic Method?, 30 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 
597, 613 (2008). 
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classroom has the appearance of scientific laboratory work.  As Menkel-
Meadow points out, this claim made the law school classroom unique in 
graduate studies; it was a place of active experience, not passive attendance 
at lectures.84  Although Langdell did not expressly make the connection, 
others later demonstrated parallels between law and the social sciences, 
which were developing a methodological affinity to the natural sciences 
even during Langdell’s era.85  The derivative analogy to science, combined 
with the persistent myth of scientific discovery, was enough to maintain the 
security of the pedagogical practices. 
Romantic notions about scientific reasoning and hopes for the 
discovery of unchanging laws of nature have made the analogy of legal 
analysis to scientific method attractive.  But another reason for the 
longevity of Langdell’s pedagogy, as Grey noted more than a quarter 
century ago, may be the fact that the rejection of Langdell’s theory left legal 
academics with no conceptual scheme with which to revitalize the law 
school curriculum.86  Academics have struggled to find a credible 
functional analogy ever since legal formalism was targeted by the legal 
realists in the early twentieth century.  Conceptual frameworks of policy 
science and legal process advanced in the mid-twentieth century had limited 
success;87 more recently, law and economics has marshaled similarly 
limited adherence.88 
In the void, a number of academics have written to defend the watered-
down practices of case examination and Socratic-style interrogation, while 
paying no heed to scientific theory.  Whether or not the Socratic/case book 
methodology is explicitly conceived of as science, generations of law 
teachers have adopted the methods and extolled their virtues.  Langdell, it 
could be said, is often perceived as having been right for the wrong reasons. 
Among the virtues that have been espoused are: 
 Learning the analytical process.  Students learn to 
synthesize rules of law.89  They get a feel for the boundary 
conflicts that define, at any given moment, the margins of 
a field in the most economical way possible.90  The 
 
84. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 33, at 582. 
85. Rubin, supra note 15, at 636, 634-40 (discussing functional data gathering approach); 
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 33, at 567. 
86. Grey, supra note 2, at 49. 
87. Id. at 50; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 33, at 567. 
88. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 33, at 568; Grey, supra note 2, at 51. 
89. Michael Vitiello, Professor Kingsfield:  The Most Misunderstood Character in 
Literature, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 955, 987 (2005). 
90. Kronman, supra note 51, at 648. 
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internalization of that questioning process91 becomes a 
concrete analytical tool for the student.92 
 Exposure to real client dilemmas.  Provided with a 
“steady stream” of “complex, real-life dilemmas of 
clients,”93 students use their knowledge of the law to work 
on particular cases, “the most difficult and most important 
art.”94 
 Practice for advocacy.  Students learn to deal with the 
pressures they will face in the practice of law.95  The 
pedagogy promotes rhetorical abilities needed in law 
practice96 by forcing students “to state issues and rules 
with precision and then to test their understanding of 
those rules in new factual settings.”97  They “learn the 
need for mental agility in handling rapid fire 
questioning”98 through the process of performing before 
peers and the instructor. 
 Coping with moral ambiguity.  Students learn the 
relationship of rules to their underlying justifications or 
policies that support those rules.99  The goal is to 
“habituat[e] students to the need for reasoned judgment 
under conditions of maximum moral ambiguity . . . giving 
them practice at rendering such judgments themselves.”100  
This challenges “students’ views and forces them to think 
more deeply than they may have done before attending 
law school.”101 
 Self discovery.  Skillful examination by the professor 
insures that students will discover legal principles for 
themselves.102  Students become confident that they can 
 
91. Burnele V. Powell, A Defense of the Socratic Method:  An Interview with Martin B. 
Louis (1934-94), 73 N.C. L. REV. 957, 957 (1995). 
92. Rhee, supra note 80, at 882. 
93. Kronman, supra note 51, at 648. 
94. Powell, supra note 91, at 987. 
95. Vitiello, supra note 89, at 987. 
96. Kronman, supra note 51, at 648. 
97. Vitiello, supra note 89, at 987. 
98. Id. at 986-87. 
99. Id. at 987. 
100. Kronman, supra note 51, at 652. 
101. Michael Vitiello, Teaching Effective Oral Argument Skills:  Forget About the Drama 
Coach, 75 MISS. L.J. 869, 902 (2006). 
102. Marshall, supra note 80, at 13. 
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discover answers on their own and can “reason through” 
what they know to solve a problem.103 
If these are the goals, however, there are many educational models that 
would serve better.  The attachment to scientific method hardly seems 
adequate to sustain the current pedagogy.104  In contrast to the apologists for 
the Langdell pedagogy, there have been other voices, voices explicitly 
calling for a new conceptual paradigm or framework for the first year 
pedagogy.  Menkel-Meadow, for example, proposes an interdisciplinary 
framework,105 and Robert Rhee advocates the mathematical heuristic of 
George Polya.106  Notably, these suggested new paradigms are 
characterized as creative,107 and even generative.108 
IV. THE NEW PARADIGM 
This section identifies a few of the major theories in the philosophy and 
history of science developed during the last eighty years.  These theories 
define science not as the discovery of fixed principles, but as rhetorical 
invention and/or creative reconceptualization.  When these ideas are parsed, 
it is possible to see that a scientific paradigm may be the conceptual 
framework to fill the void. 
The ideas of two scientific philosophers have been particularly 
influential in the last century.  In 1934, Popper published THE LOGIC OF 
SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY, which repudiated the longstanding 
observationalist-inductivist account of scientific method and advocated 
empirical falsifiability as the criterion for distinguishing scientific work 
from non-science.109  Popper’s main contributions to scientific philosophy 
were to demonstrate the flaws of inductivism,110 and to explain why a 
 
103. Powell, supra note 91, at 957. 
104. The critics of the pedagogy abound.  See, e.g., Chester Alumbaugh & Scott E. 
Alumbaugh, Functionalizing First Year Legal Education:  Toward a New Pedagogical 
Jurisprudence, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 21, 21 (1991); Peggy Cooper Davis & Elizabeth Ehrenfest 
Steinglass, A Dialogue About Socratic Teaching, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 249, 249 
(1997); Thomas D. Eisele, The Poverty of Socratic Questioning:  Asking and Answering in the 
Meno, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 221, 221 (1994); Jerome Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer School, 81 
U. PA. L. REV. 907, 907 (1933); Duncan Kennedy, How the Law School Fails:  A Polemic, 1 
YALE REV. L. & SOC. ACTION 71, 71 (1970). 
105. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 33, at 557.  Interestingly, the disciplines identified by 
Menkel-Meadow seem to exclude traditional sciences. 
106. Rhee, supra note 80, at 882. 
107. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 33, at 559; Rhee, supra note 80, at 897. 
108. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 33, at 559. 
109. POPPER, LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY, supra note 27, at 17-20. 
110. Inductivism here refers to the idea, often attributed to Francis Bacon, that to develop 
theories about cause and effect, one needs to make specific observations of phenomenological 
results from experiments made in controlled conditions, and to generalize therefrom.  In general, 
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theory cannot originate exclusively from empirical data.111  He also 
convincingly argued that data is selective and subject to human choice, 
thereby undermining faith in scientists’ ability to objectively observe the 
world.112 
Then, in 1962, Kuhn published THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC 
REVOLUTIONS in which he argued there was little evidence of scientists 
actually following Popper’s falsificationist methodology and described the 
work of scientists as operating with a series of paradigms.113  Kuhn 
approaches science from a historical perspective and has determined that 
the history of science is characterized by revolutions in scientific 
perspective.114  Observing the changes in scientific thought and practices, 
Kuhn concludes that revolutionary changes happen through a process of 
definition.115  The ideas that have developed in the wake of these theories 
have relevance to legal as well as to scientific thought. 
Popper’s skepticism about the viability of inductive proof to science 
was not new.  As early as the mid-eighteenth century, the empiricist David 
Hume argued there were serious logical problems with induction.116  In the 
mid-twentieth century, Popper joined those who believed science would 
best progress using deductive reasoning as its primary emphasis.  His 
critique of the prevailing scientific method, which came to be known as 
critical rationalism, was based in large part on the apparent impossibility of 
recording everything observed.117 
At the core of Popper’s theory is the notion of a logical asymmetry 
between verification and falsifiability.  His idea is that no scientific 
principle can be verified by scientific testing, but can only be “falsified” by 
observation or experiment.118  Some process of selection is needed, Popper 
 
Bacon began with the premise that “what the sciences stand in need of is a form of induction 
which shall analyze experience and take it to pieces, and by a due process of exclusion and 
rejection lead to an inevitable conclusion.”  FRANCIS BACON, THE PLAN OF THE INSTAURATIO 
MAGNA (1620), excerpted in 39 HARVARD CLASSICS 127, 140 (1909). 
111. POPPER, MYTH OF THE FRAMEWORK, supra note 24, at 84. 
112. Id. at 86. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. at 92. 
116. HOWSON, supra note 27, at 10-12. 
117. See generally KARL POPPER, ALL LIFE IS PROBLEM SOLVING (1994) [hereinafter 
POPPER, ALL LIFE IS PROBLEM SOLVING]; KARL POPPER, CONJECTURE AND REFUTATION:  THE 
GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE (1963) [hereinafter POPPER, CONJECTURE AND 
REFUTATION]; KARL POPPER, OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE:  AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH 
(1972)[hereinafter POPPER, OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE]; POPPER, LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC 
DISCOVERY, supra note 27. 
118. POPPER, CONJECTURE AND REFUTATION, supra note 117, at vii; POPPER, OBJECTIVE 
KNOWLEDGE, supra note 117, at 119; see also, THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC 
REVOLUTIONS 113 (2d. ed. 1970); PAUL FEYERABEND, AGAINST METHOD 111 (1975). 
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noted, and thus observation is always selective.119  A precondition to any 
selection process is a theoretical preconception about what is to be 
empirically examined.120  Without a working hypothesis there can be no 
way to determine which data are germane.121  That being the case, Popper 
argued there can be no sound justification for devising a general rule from 
the observation of particulars.122  Induction cannot yield certainty.123 
In Popper’s view, scientific theory should make predictions, but 
empirical methods should be aimed at disproving theories rather than 
continuously attempting to prove them.124  The more generally applicable a 
theory can be shown to be, the greater its value.  Outcomes could 
potentially falsify a theory, but can never definitively prove the positive.  
Thus, in his view, scientific theory, and human knowledge generally, is 
irreducibly conjectural or hypothetical, and is generated by the imagination 
in order to solve problems that have arisen in specific historical/ cultural 
settings.125  Accordingly, scientific method can aid in a progression toward 
truth but can never produce a final, definitive explanation.126 
Popper’s critics concede that data is selective, but contend that 
although researchers often have a theory to guide data selection, they don’t 
necessarily follow it consciously or prescriptively.127  Moreover, it has been 
argued, just as it is impossible to conclusively demonstrate an immutable 
principle through continuous observation, it is impossible to conclusively 
falsify theories by empirical data.128  “Falsification[],” as Martin Gardner 
indicates, “can be as fuzzy and elusive as confirmations.”129  What critics 
chiefly take issue with, however, is the idea that a single method of analysis 
applies to all science.130  Kuhn in particular has been critical of any such 
overly simplistic picture of science. 
 
119. POPPER, MYTH OF THE FRAMEWORK, supra note 24, at 89, 104-15. 
120. POPPER, LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY, supra note 27, at 72. 
121. Id. at 72-73. 
122. Id. at 75-76. 
123. Id. at 4, 76; KUHN, supra note 118, at 52. 
124. See POPPER, LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY, supra note 27, at 4. 
125. See generally id. at 57-74 (giving a more detailed exploration of falsifiability). 
126. See id. at 6-8. 
127. ANTHONY O’HEAR, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 39-41 (1989); 
KUHN, supra note 118, at 4. 
128. MARTIN GARDNER, ARE UNIVERSES THICKER THAN BLACKBERRIES? 13 (2004); CARL 
GUSTAV HEMPEL, SELECTED PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 203 (Richard Jeffrey ed., 2000); KUHN, 
supra note 118, at 4. 
129. GARDNER, supra note 128, at 13; KUHN, supra note 118, at 4-5. 
130. See generally LARRY LAUDEN, SCIENCE AND VALUES:  THE AIMS OF SCIENCE AND 
THEIR ROLES IN SCIENTIFIC DEBATE 16 (1986) (discussing, in particular, the work of Paul 
Feyerabend and Ian Mistroff). 
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Like Popper, Kuhn maintains all observation is theory laden, driven by 
a paradigm that is encoded with a particular interpretation of the world.131  
According to Kuhn, the dominant paradigm is accepted as knowledge until 
anomalies are discovered.  Scientists then begin to question the basis of the 
paradigm itself, new theories emerge which challenge the dominant 
paradigm, and eventually one of these new theories becomes accepted as 
the new paradigm.132  Thus, science does not progress via a linear 
accumulation of new knowledge, but undergoes periodic revolutions, or 
paradigm shifts, whereby the nature of scientific inquiry is abruptly 
transformed.133 
Science, in Kuhn’s view, progresses through three distinct stages:  
prescience, normal science, and revolutionary science.134  Normal science is 
clearly distinguishable from revolutionary science.  The former builds on 
past knowledge using existing paradigms:  routine, specific, pre-patterned 
and accessible methods of problem solving.  It actualizes theory by 
increasing the number of matches between data discovered (often through 
experimentation) and predictions.135  Thus the norm is “an attempt to force 
nature into the preformed and relatively inflexible box that the paradigm 
supplies.”136  Revolutionary science, on the other hand, generally begins 
with awareness of an anomaly in the data.  The ensuing empirical study 
explores how far the anomaly extends or how frequently it occurs.137  In the 
field, this can lead to crisis, precipitated by a string of anomalous results, 
which thereby force the creation of a new paradigm.  Until scientists 
actually see nature in a different way, however, the new facts are not seen 
as scientific facts at all – merely as anomalies.  It requires a new paradigm 
to subsume the old results along with the anomalous results into a new 
framework.138  The work of Herbert Simons139 and Richard Rorty,140 
 
131. JAMES A. MARCUM, THOMAS KUHN’S REVOLUTION:  AN HISTORICAL PHILOSOPHY OF 
SCIENCE 60-61 (2008). 
132. Compare KUHN, supra note 118, at 60-65 with FEYERABEND, supra note 118, at 30-31.  
Feyerabend argues for a far more skeptical approach to knowledge, asserting that since no one can 
predict what shape future knowledge will have, one universal method of gaining knowledge 
should never be assumed.  Feyerabend agrees with Kuhn that the history of science is the history 
of different viewpoints, and for Feyerabend this means that what counts as “knowledge” in the 
future may have paradigms we cannot yet know.  Because we cannot yet know them, we should 
not attempt to forbid future intellectual enterprise by attempting to define one narrow dominant 
paradigm of knowledge using any particular model. 
133. JOHNSON, supra note 31, at 137-38. 
134. KUHN, supra note 118, at 92-95. 
135. Id. at 24. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. at 53. 
138. Id. 
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among others, helped develop the idea that Kuhn’s STRUCTURE is rhetorical 
and, by implication, that science itself is rhetorical in nature. 
The science of the post-modern world may not seem to suggest a 
paradigm for the field of law, which almost by definition demands some 
measure of constancy and consistency.  But in law, as in science, successful 
analysis depends on the ability to group or associate situations into what 
Kuhn calls “similarity sets.”141  Moreover, it should be remembered that 
when relying on theories, scientists use assumptions that are supported by 
empirical evidence, despite the fact that an infinite number of other theories 
might explain the exact same set of data.  In both fields, a heightened 
inquiry into similarity groupings – asking the question, “similar to what?” – 
advances understandings, past the automatic, unreflective, “primitive” stage 
of categorization, towards a possible transfer of subsets into a separate or 
new category.142  This is the practical foundation of critical change.143  
Lawyers who, like scientists, can and do engage in this type of heightened 
analysis, could be expanding their pedagogy to include the broader view of 
science of knowledge progressing through conceptual paradigm shifts and 
invention.  Today’s world is one of accelerating paradigm shifts and 
innovations, and begs the introduction of skills to manage rapid changes.144  
A neoglobal perspective also calls for study that integrates macro-analysis 
of systems with the microanalysis of individual cases.145 
V. APPLICATIONS OF THE NEW PARADIGM 
A few examples of how a modern scientific model might apply in 
today’s law schools will help clarify matters.  Using the legal principles and 
paradigms relating to defenses to negligence, the prohibition against cruel 
and unusual punishment, and statutory construction of sexual harassment, 
the applicability of scientific method can be demonstrated. 
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A. DEFENSES TO NEGLIGENCE 
At common law, only two defenses to negligence were recognized:  
contributory negligence and assumption of risk.146  Either defense 
successfully asserted operated as a complete bar to recovery by a 
plaintiff.147  Contributory negligence has been defined as conduct on the 
part of the plaintiff which falls below the standard of care to which a 
reasonable person should conform for self protection, and which is a legally 
contributing cause in bringing about the harm to the plaintiff.148  Under a 
Langdellian approach to law, the rule at common law was clear:  
contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff in a torts suit barred 
recovery absolutely.  An empirical study of thousands of cases in the 
nineteenth century would surely have supported this legal principle. 
Over time, of course, anomalies started to appear.  In England, in 1842, 
a court decided to instruct a jury that a plaintiff’s contributory negligence 
was not a complete bar to recovery if the defendant still had an opportunity 
to avoid harm after the plaintiff’s contributory negligence occurred, and 
negligently failed to avail himself of that opportunity.149  Similar court 
rulings followed, and a new paradigm was born: last clear chance.150 
Last Clear Chance was, indeed, a paradigmatic shift.  It has been 
characterized as a humanitarian doctrine, one meant to soften the harsh 
results of depriving the plaintiff of all recovery in the situation in which the 
plaintiff bears little responsibility for the harm done.151  In other words, 
contributory negligence, the immutable rule, was not working.  Thus, what 
was demanded was not a tortuous mangling of facts to conform to an 
inflexible law or an application of an inflexible law that would result in 
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injustice; what was needed was a creative novel doctrine to take into 
account new knowledge and to satisfy actual human needs. 
Last Clear Chance, as a doctrine, could be viewed as an experiment, an 
“attempted solution,” in Popper’s words.  Although the doctrine was further 
refined over time to distinguish between helpless plaintiffs and inattentive 
plaintiffs,152 it seems, in operation, to have had limited utility.  This is in 
large part because lawmakers came to recognize the need for a more 
significant paradigm shift and crafted a solution to deal with the problem of 
a complete bar on recovery under contributory negligence principles.  Most 
states, either through common or law or by statute, adopted a comparative 
negligence or comparative fault approach to determining fault and damages, 
allowing plaintiffs to make partial recoveries based on a concept of 
proportional responsibility.153 
In this evolution can be seen a “network of commitments” akin to 
puzzle solving in the scientific realm.154  The process follows a pattern of 
conceptual/theoretical/instrumental/methodological development.  For 
years, lawyers understood the world as it was ordered, in accordance with 
an accepted notion of negligence (the conceptual).  This idea took shape as 
more precise doctrine, and was applied with far-reaching scope 
(theoretical).  Over time, courts scrutinized more and more carefully the 
“pockets of disorder” arising in negligence cases and sought to reconcile 
actual results with predictions indicated by the theory (instrumental).  This 
led to refinements in the law (methodological), and the process was 
reiterated.155 
B. CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 
In the criminal procedure area, the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment clause provides another interesting example.  In this 
instance, the inquiry for student scholars begins with a constitutional 
provision, the origins of which are not well understood.  It is known that the 
phrase “cruel and unusual punishment” was lifted or borrowed from the 
1689 English Bill of Rights, but beyond that, scholars have unearthed no 
clear indication of the framers’ intent as to the meaning and scope of the 
clause.  Contemporaneously, the Crimes Act of 1790, in addition to 
providing for the imposition of death by hanging in certain cases, granted 
courts the right to require corpse dissection in cases of treason, and 
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whipping or standing in pillory for some lesser offenses.156  One hundred 
years later, about the time Langdell became Harvard’s law school dean, In 
re Kemmler157 was decided.  In that case, the Supreme Court made note of 
earlier punitive practices, such as burning at the stake, crucifixion, and 
breaking on a wheel, that would no longer be deemed acceptable.  In the 
same opinion, the Court determined that a relatively new method of 
execution, electrocution, did not offend constitutional standards relating to 
“cruel and unusual” punishment.158  Another hundred years would find 
some courts outlawing electrocution as cruel and unusual within the 
definitions of their state constitutions.159 
Students investigating whether a particular practice constitutes cruel 
and unusual punishment would be likely to find Popper’s observations 
about scientific method quite apt.  In Eighth Amendment cases, students 
would need a theoretical preconception about what is being examined, and 
they would likely find that courts in these cases had been working from 
similar preconceptions.  That notion, in fact, now seems to be the explicit 
basis for courts’ analyses. 
Since 1958, with the decision in Trop v. Dulles,160 the standard for 
determining the constitutionality of any punitive method has been whether 
it is consistent with “evolving standards of decency.”161  In Trop, the Court 
held that denaturalization as punishment for desertion is “obnoxious” in an 
“enlightened democracy.”162  On similar grounds, the Court held that 
twelve to twenty years in chains for the offense of making a false statement 
in a public record,163 or a prison sentence for a mere status offense,164 is 
inconsistent with modern sensibilities and norms. 
Empirical “observations” of other court decisions would be 
confounding to researchers looking for the “fundamental doctrine” guiding 
principled decision making.  They might discover that the Eighth 
Amendment is implicated when criminal punishments are being carried 
out,165 but only if the conduct under scrutiny is actual punishment and not 
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an incidental condition of confinement.166  Although they are technically, 
under current categorical definitions, conditions of confinement and not 
punishments, deliberate deprivations of essentials such as food, heart, and 
medical care (for serious medical needs) can be cruel and unusual 
punishment,167 but officials must have actual awareness of the risk and 
deliberately disregard known rules of custodial care.168  The Eighth 
Amendment does not prohibit a second attempt at imposing death by 
electrocution after a badly botched first attempt;169 it is not implicated in 
situations involving school punishment.170  The execution of mentally 
incapacitated persons is considered cruel,171 as is execution of those who 
were juveniles at the time of a crime’s commission172 – “juvenile” being a 
distinction that did not even exist at time Langdell took the reins at 
Harvard. 
As Popper would have argued, given this set of data, there can be no 
sound justification for devising a general rule from the observation of 
particulars.  Kuhn would further point out that the data here illustrates how 
knowledge is only as good as the particular examples that support the 
underlying paradigm – in this case, “evolving standards of decency.”173  
When, as here, anomalies are not only discovered, but proliferate, it is time 
to question the basis of the paradigm itself and create new theories.  
Eventually, one will emerge that will find acceptance as the new paradigm. 
C. SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
The old scientific method paradigm privileged common law over 
statutory law.  With a new scientific model, it is far easier to see how law 
can be invented.  One example in the field of constitutional law can be 
found in sexual harassment.  Sexual harassment, as a legal concept, had no 
real existence even fifty years ago.  The origins of the term, used to apply to 
behaviors well known to have been transpiring throughout history, 
reportedly go back to the early 1970s.174  At that time, a group of feminists, 
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meeting on Cornell’s campus and discussing a potential case, came up with 
the term to describe situational harms with which they were all familiar.175  
As a legal concept, the term first appears in the case law in 1974, in the case 
of Barnes v. Train.176  Then, in 1976 Williams v. Saxbe177 was decided, 
finding sexual harassment to be a form of sexual discrimination.178  The 
judicial adoption of the legal concept was followed by enactment of EEOC 
guidelines in 1980, which explicitly prohibited sexual harassment as a form 
of sexual discrimination.  In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,179 decided in 
1986, the Supreme Court recognized sexual harassment as a violation of 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.180 
Sexual harassment is a clear example of a paradigmatic change that has 
come about through creation, invention and experimentation.  The women 
who analyzed existing data in the 1970s developed a new theory from a 
number of existing theories, relying on data both old and new.  Initial 
attempts to obtain relief under the law began with a process described by 
Kuhn, which he credits Wittgenstein with developing.181  The process is 
that by which one confronting a new situation assigns it to a category (or 
“natural family”) believed to have similar characteristics or overlapping 
resemblances.  In sexual harassment situations, those familiar “families” 
were criminal assault and sex discrimination.  The transfer of a subset of 
assault victims into the category of sex discrimination signaled a “critical 
change” in the legal paradigm.182  The new theories were tested in the 
courts and proffered to law and rule-making bodies, and with this 
methodological shift came a conceptual one.183 
Thus, it is clear that the work of the lawyer-scientist-researcher was not 
(and is not) static or passive; discovery is only one aspect of the work that 
has been done.  In fact, as recent commentators tell us, science most 
succeeds when it involves experimentation in, and a search for, 
recombinations of constituent elements.184  Put another way, “ideas are 
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works of bricolage; they’re built out of detritus.”185  The lawyer’s work has 
also involved theorizing, hypothesis testing, creation, invention, and 
reconceptualization.  This has always been the lawyer’s work, and it finds a 
parallel in scientific method. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In earlier times, one of the attractions of science as an analogy to law 
was its purported certainty and predictability.  In 1934, Popper directly 
questioned this assumption and proposed a different way of looking at 
scientific study.  As he later explained his thinking: 
The natural as well as the social sciences always start from 
problems, from the fact that something inspires amazement in us, 
as the Greek philosophers used to say.  To solve these problems, 
the sciences use fundamentally the same method that common 
sense employs, the method of trial and error.  To be more precise, 
it is the method of trying out solutions to our problem and then 
discarding the false ones as erroneous.186 
What would happen if we were to think about law in this way?  Or 
what if first-year teachers were to begin with a Kuhnian perspective, that 
the world of law is structured according to certain paradigms, that law is 
built on a belief that society needs these ordered paradigms to survive, but 
that they are more conventional and utilitarian than true or certain?  Wills 
and contracts are the inventions of lawyers.  Property, privacy, guilt – these 
are all intellectual constructs, operational principles, that aid in the ordering 
of “knowledge.”  They are not, and never were, essential truths. 
We value order, we crave certainty and predictability, and it is clear 
that to avoid total anarchy or chaos, as a policy matter, society should not 
recreate the world with every dispute.  But law can and must change; 
indeed, it is the responsibility of lawyers to advocate for change and to re-
form the law by generating new paradigms and creating novel technologies.  
Law school should teach rising lawyers something about how to be creative 
and inventive and provide guidance in how to make responsible judgments 
about when paradigm shifting might be called for. 
Today’s law schools are undergoing a shift in perspective if not a 
revolution on the scale of Langdell’s.  The change is creating conflict, 
inevitably accompanied by both attempts to salvage the past and pressures 
to overthrow the past.  As the evidence of a transformation grows, however, 
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so too will the clamor for an analogy that can serve as a guiding rationale 
for any major changes.  The lure of a scientific analogy is still powerful.  As 
in the days of Langdell, many hold to the belief that “science” is “reserved 
for fields that do progress in obvious ways.”187  It is a club to which many 
professionals want to belong or with which they would like to be 
associated.  For that reason, many academics are inclined to seek parallels 
between their own professions and the “hard” sciences, and look for 
analogic techniques, methods or ideologies that would permit a claim to the 
scientific appellation. 
In this environment, what science might now offer to law is a process 
that includes these strategies: 
1. Observations, using textual and sensory sources, by means of 
which students discover what the law “is,” both textually and 
operationally; 
2. Identification of the conceptual paradigms or perspectives that 
support the law; 
3. Development of strategies for communicating and upholding the 
soundness of existing paradigms; 
4. Development of skills needed to test existing rules and 
standards and to attempt new solutions, using multiple 
methodologies; and 
5. Exploration and assessment of values needed to make 
judgments about the propriety of paradigm shifts. 
The first two of these strategies incorporate the knowledge domain 
identified in the Carnegie Report,188 but go beyond empirical data collection 
in courts and legislatures.  Strategies 3 and 4 address the skill dimension of 
Carnegie;189 and the values dimension is embedded in the last strategy.190  
Law schools have considerable expertise in these various strategies, 
although doctrinal knowledge, skills, and values have often occupied 
separate spheres and have been assigned to widely varying and often 
conflicting conceptual frameworks.  Law school professors currently ask 
students to assert, defend, and compare, with an implicit emphasis on the 
importance of understanding existing paradigms.  An unstated message of 
immutability, correctness, and permanence often accompanies this 
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approach.  Mastery of existing rules provides a source of satisfaction to 
learners of the law. 
But in much the same way that academics approach problems in their 
scholarship, not only calling into question the rationale and efficacy of law 
and its operations, but offering new models and overlooked perspectives, 
they could, in their pedagogical roles, teach students how to do the same.  
Law professors could be more deliberate about asking students what is not 
working in the particular paradigm they are uncovering, and what might be 
some ways to think about making it better.  The real pressures of societal 
needs – the consequences of law – should also be part of the analysis.  The 
science paradigm of the twenty-first century provides a shift in perspective 
that allows for the reordering of knowledge that is more inclusive of 
multiple existing realities and opens the gates for creativity and new 
understanding.  The law school classroom is an optimal environment for 
this work.  The classroom can be modeled on a scientific think tank, where 
highly motivated and focused people come together, widening the pool of 
contributing minds and increasing the likelihood for innovation and 
progress.191  This is not so different in concept from Langdell’s vision of a 
legal scientific laboratory. 
As much as we crave certainty, law cannot provide it.  Through such 
inventions as rights, stare decisis, and legislative mandates, legal systems 
can provide a sense of order and enough predictability and stability to allow 
societies to function on this side of anarchy.  But law, like science, is not 
static and the knowledge required to perfect legal decision making lies far 
beyond human capacity.  What we can do is take account of what we do 
know and what we have given members of our community (notably judges 
and to some extent legislative and administrative bodies) the power to say, 
and from that point, engage in the inventive and creative work of science.  
This will allow us to measure progress and success “in terms of evolution 
from the community’s state of knowledge at any given time.”192  We can 
then use the model of science not to discover the right answer – as in 
incontrovertible – but to create and use conceptual paradigms with a goal of 
aspiring to the right answer – as in fair and just. 
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